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Free-Market Illusion and Global Financial Crisis  
Dr. Kalim Siddiqui ∗  Mainstream, Vol. XLVI, No. 49, November 25th 2008: New 
Delhi, India.  
 
The financial crisis facing the Wall Street is the worst since the Great 
Depression and will have a major impact on the US and global economy. The 
ongoing global financial crisis will have ‘domino’ effect and spill over all 
aspects of the economy. The Western world’s messianic faith in the market 
forces and to deregulation, the market friendly governments have no choice 
but to step in. This point is well summarised by recent United Nation’s World 
Economic and Social Surveys (2008) is that “markets cannot be left alone to 
deliver the appropriate and desired levels of economic security”.   
 
The top five investment banks in the US have ceased to exist in their previous 
forms. Bears Stearns was taken over some time ago. Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac are nationalized to prevent their collapse. Fannie and Freddie 
together underwrite half of the home loans in the United States, and the sum 
involved is of $ 3 trillion – about double of entire annual output of British 
economy. This is the biggest rescue operation since the credit crunch began. 
Lehman Brothers, an investment banks with 158 years old history declared 
bankrupt; Merrill Lynch, another Wall Street icon, chose to pre-empt a similar 
fate by deciding to sell to the Bank of America; and Goldman Sachs and 
Morgan Stanley have decided to transform themselves into ordinary deposit 
banks.  AIG, the world’s largest insurance company has survived through the 
injection of funds $85 billion from the US government.  
 
The question arises why this has happened? 
Besides cyclical crisis of capitalism, there are some recent factors which have 
contributed towards this crisis. Under the so-called “innovative” approach 
financial institutions systematically underestimated risks during boom in 
property prices, which makes such boom more prolonged. This relates to 
short-sightedness of speculators and their unrestrained greed, who during the 
asset price boom believed that it would stay forever. This resulted into 
keeping the risk aspects at minimum and thus resulted into more and more 
risk taking financial activities. Loans were made on the basis of collateral 
whose value was inflated by a bubble. And collateral is now worth less than 
the loan. Credit was available up to full value of the property which was 
assessed at inflated market prices. Credits were given in anticipation of rising 
property prices will continue. Under looming recession and uncertainty, to pay 
back their mortgage many of them are forced to sell their houses, at a time 
when banks are reluctant to lend and buyers would like to wait in a hope that 
property prices will further come down. All these factors would lead towards a 
further decline in property prices. 
 
The Northern Rocks’ deposits, for example, were doubled from £10 billion to 
£23 billion between 1997 and 2006. However, there has been 6 fold increases 
in its mortgage lending over the same period. This means that retail deposits 
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as a proportion of Northern Rock’s total liabilities and equity, fell from 63 % to 
22 %.  The company was unable to fund its ambitious mortgage growth from 
its deposits and it began borrowing increasing amounts of funds from money 
markets on short-term basis. This worked very well, because market 
conditions had been stable and raising funds in the money market was not a 
problem. In August 2007, when money market froze, the company got itself 
into a position whereby it was running out of money and its strategy of 
borrowing short and lending long became impossible, thus ending in 
catastrophic.  
 
The current major Western government intervention in the financial markets 
may be aimed to avoid recession. But we must not forget that bail out to these 
reckless financiers, who promoted speculation and underestimated risks, 
would mean rewarding them on their wrong doings. The fact that bailout 
implicitly condones the earlier behaviour that led to the financial crises. It is 
irony that from being the greatest advocate of a deregulated banking system. 
The US Federal Reserve and Bank of England may well turn out to be the 
largest holding company of banks.  
 
The very assumption that rescue plan is to help is not true in the light of past 
experiences. The IMF and US Treasury bail-outs 10 years ago in Indonesia, 
Thailand, Brazil, Russia and Argentina did not work for those countries. 
Although it did enable Wall Street to get back most of its money. The people 
of these poor countries paid for the financial markets’ mistakes. Joseph 
Stiglitz, a prominent US economist, argues on the bailout: “Defenders of the 
bailout argue that the institutions are too big to be allowed to fail. If that is the 
case, the government had a responsibility to regulate so that they would not 
fail. No insurance company would provide fire insurance without demanding 
adequate sprinklers”. (Financial Times, 25th July, 2008) 
 
Moreover, the 1990s experience of Latin America clearly shows that financial 
liberalization does not necessarily contribute positively to investment and 
economic growth. These countries that had opened up their financial sector to 
attract capital inflows often experienced instability in their financial markets 
and speculative attack on their currency. De-regulation in the US started 
during Reagan administration and continued apace since then. In 1999, the 
US Congress scrapped regulatory restraints on financial sectors. The 
regulation was dismantled because it was said that finance is the engine of 
growth as long it is given free rein. It unleashed concentration and 
centralisation of power into a small group of financial companies.  
 
The question arises who should pay the price for taking irresponsible 
decisions? Those who are in-charge and responsible for the running these 
financial institutions that collapse walk away without paying any price but in 
fact substantially enriching themselves. For example, Lehman Brothers, the 
major Wall Street bank which collapsed, but its CEO Richard Fuld Jr. who 
was at the helm of affairs during its period of irresponsible behaviour, received 
$ 62 million pay in 2006. According to recent report in the Financial Times, the 
compensation for major executives of 7 largest United States banks 
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amounted to $95 billion over the past 3 years even as the same banks 
recorded around $500 billion in losses.  
 
John Maynard Keynes argued that the fault of the market economy was that it 
does not distinguish between “enterprise” and “speculation”, so that unfettered 
functioning of the markets made the livelihood of the people dependent on the 
whims of speculators. He had wanted finance to remain national, so that the 
state could have autonomy to pursue polices suited to the national needs. 
Keynes, who wanted desperately to save capitalism, argued that it could only 
survive through state intervention. With the increasing dominance of finance 
capital this policy was reversed in early 1970s when the “free-market” 
fundamentalism was imposed in the name “efficiency” in most of the countries 
through the IMF and World Bank.  
 
In short, this crisis is an inevitable consequence of the path of globalisation 
and free-market fundamentalism that is unfolding in recent decades. This 
process has been accompanied by growing economic inequalities both within 
countries and between the rich and poor countries. The Human Development 
Report, 2007-2008 confirms this with indisputable statistics. Forty per cent of 
world’s population living on less than $2 a day accounts for 5 % of global 
income while the richest 20 % accounts for three quarters of world income. 
The global financial crisis must open the eyes of the developing countries 
many of them earlier uncritically supported financial sector liberalisation. It is 
time put an end to financial liberalization and to take steps to strengthen the 
financial sector in a manner which safeguards the country’s economy and 
contribute to sustained development.  
 
Dr. Kalim Siddiqui is an economist and teaches at the University of Huddersfield, UK. He 
can be reached at: k.u.siddiqui@hud.ac.uk 
 
